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DeSouza: Criminal Procedure

CRmnNALPROCEDURE
PARRETTI v. UNITED STATES
143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Parretti v. United States, l the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, addressed two constitutional claims: (1) whether Giancarlo Parretti's arrest pursuant to an Extradition Treaty with France violated the Fourth
Amendment;2 and (2) whether his detention without bail prior
to the French government's request for his extradition violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3
The en bane court refused to address these issues, however,
claiming that since Parretti fled the United States while his
appeal was pending, he was a fugitive from justice.· The en
bane court therefore dismissed his appeal under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. 5

1. 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 179 (1998). The
appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was argued and
submitted on December 18, 1997 before the Ninth Circuit sitting en banco The decision
was fIled on May 1, 1998. Judge Pregerson authored the opinion of the en banc court.
Judge Reinhardt wrote the dissent.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("[Njo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or afill'mation ... ").
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d at 508.
5. See id. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine empowers the court to "dismiss the
appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction of the United States after timely appealing." See id. at 510. See also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242
(1993) (Dismissal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine serves as an "appropriate
sanction" against the defendant fugitive.).

49
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1990, Pathe Communications Corporation, headed by appellant, Giancarlo Parretti, an Italian citizen and resident,
purchased MGM-United Artists. 6 This transaction gave rise to
a number of lawsuits. 7 On October 9, 1995, Parretti came to
the United States in response to two of these lawsuits. 6 The
following day, France sent a diplomatic note to the United
States Department of State, requesting Parretti's "provisional
arrest" pursuant to the U.S.-France Treaty of Extradition. 9

An assistant United States Attorney, acting on behalf of the
French government, filed a Complaint for Provisional Arrest
Warrant. 10 No affidavits or other competent evidence were attached in support of the complaint. 11 Nevertheless, a United
States Magistrate Judge issued an arrest warrant based solely
on the information contained within the complaint. 12 On October 18, 1995, federal agents arrested Parretti pursuant to a
provisional arrest warrant at the Los Angeles law firm of
White & Case. 13

6. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d SOB, 509 (9th Cir. 199B).
7. See m.
B. See m. at 509·510. The state of Delaware obtained jurisdiction over Parretti in
October 1995 in regard to perjury charges. He was also to be deposed in regard to
another suit filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. See Parretti v. United States, 112
F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by Parretti v. United States 112 F.3d 75B
(9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn by Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d SOB (9th Cir. 199B)
(en bane).
9. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510. Article IV of the French Treaty provides:
The arrest and detention of a fugitive may be applied for on information, even
by telegraph, of the existence of a judgment of conviction or of a warrant of arrest ... and that the person provisionally arrested may be held for up to 40
days pending a possible request that the fugitive be extradited.
22 U.S.T. 407, as amended, T.I.A.S. 7075.
10. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn by Parretti v. United
States, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en bane). See infra note 28. The complaint alleged that each of the charged offenses was an extraditable offense under the Treaty
and that France had requested Parretti's "provisional arrest" under Article IV of the
treaty. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761. The French arrest warrant charged Parretti with
misuse of company assets, forgery, embezzlement by false pretenses, and perjury. See

m.

11. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761.
12. See m.
13. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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Parretti was held without bail pending a request by the
French government for his extradition. 14 During this time,
Parretti filed an application to be released on bail and he filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. 15 Both requests were denied on November 9, 1995. 16
Parretti then filed a motion seeking emergency review. 17 On
November 21, 1995, the Ninth Circuit granted Parretti's motion and ordered his release. 18 Eight days later, pursuant to
France's request, the United States government filed a formal
request with the Magistrate Judge for his extradition. 19 On
May 10, 1996, the formal extradition hearing was held before
the Magistrate Judge.20 Parretti was present at this hearing.21
On May 31, 1996, Parretti was found extraditable on all
charges alleged in the French ~rrest warrant. 22 Subsequently,
on July 1, 1996, Parretti flled a habeas petition, challenging
the Magistrate Judge's finding of extraditability, in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. 23

In October 1996, the Delaware superior court tried and convicted Parretti on criminal charges relating to a suit arising
from the purchase of MGM studios. 24 Pending sentencing on
these offenses, Parretti fled the Delaware court's jurisdiction in
January of 1997.25

14. See id. at 510.
15. See id. In Parretti's habeas petition in the district court, he argued that the
warrant for his provisional arrest was issued without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761-763. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit
for emergency review, Parretti argued that his detention without bail violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause since he did not pose a risk of flight or danger to the
community. See id. at 777.
16. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 510.
19. See id. at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
20. See Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1368 n.6.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510, 512.
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On March 12, 1997, the district court dismissed Parretti's
habeas petition with prejudice pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 26
Thereafter, on May 6, 1997, the Ninth Circuit panel released a published opinion regarding its November 21, 1995
order for Parretti's release.27 On October 2, 1997, the Ninth
Circuit granted the United States government's request for rehearing en banc.28
III.
A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed the United
States government's appeal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine (hereinafter "the doctrine").29 The majority
explained that the doctrine empowered the court to "dismiss an
appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction of the United
States after timely appealing. nao
The court set out the four rationales underpinning the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as applied to Parretti's appeal. 31
First, the court reasoned that Parretti's fugitive status disentitled him from "calling upon the resources of the court to re-

26. See Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1368 n.6.
27. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by Parretti v. United States 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). The amended opinion was subsequently withdrawn by Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508 (1998). In the amended
opinion, the panel held in part that: (1) as a matter of first impression, sections of the
extradition treaty with France which permitted "provisional arrest" without independentjudicial determination of probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment's warrant
clause; and (2) detention of a fugitive without bail violated due process, absent a
showing that the fugitive posed flight risk. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997).
Note that "where an order specifies that the opinion of the panel has been withdrawn,
that opinion shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited in either briefs or
oral argument to the Ninth Circuit or any district court in the Ninth Circuit." U.S. CT.
OF ApP. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (5), 28 U.S.C.A. The Ninth Circuit issued the May 6, 1997
opinion to explain its November 1995 order. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758, 776 n.22.
28. See Parretti, 143 F.3d. at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
29. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1998).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 511.
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solve his claims. "32 Therefore, Parretti forfeited his right to an
appeal when he fled the jurisdiction of the United States. 33
Second, the court found that Parretti's fugitive status rendered him. beyond the reach of the court's jurisdiction.3.f Thus,
without jurisdiction, the court concluded that its judgment
would not be enforceable. 35
Third, the court reasoned that invoking the fugitive disentitlement doctrine served as a deterrent and promoted the integrity of appellate practice. 36 Lastly, the court stated that the
adversary character of the criminal litigation could be compromised because the fugitive's counsel may lose incentive to represent a fugitive client. 37
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine and withdrew the panel opinion.36
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, argued that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine did not apply to Parretti's circumstances. 39

32.

Id., citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970), which holds that:
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the
merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review
escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While
such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or
controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources
of the Court for determination of his claims.
Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366.
33. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511.
34. See id., citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239-240
(1993), for the proposition that it is within the court's discretion to refuse to hear a
criminal case when the defendant fugitive cannot be made to respond to any ruling.
35. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511.
36. See id. (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 242, in tum citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975».
37. See id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting». Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, noted that this rationale was not applicable
in the instant case since Parretti's counsel agreed to continue his representation in
spite of his client's fugitive status. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
38. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758 (1997).
39. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511-512.
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He asserted that the court had the duty to reach the merits of
the case. 40
The dissent noted that the purpose of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is to deny fugitives of the benefits and privileges of the court's jurisdiction.'! The dissent reasoned that the
majority's dismissal did not deny Parretti of any such benefits
because Parretti did not seek relief from the court. 42 Instead,
the dissent explained that the United States government
sought relief on appeal from the precedential effect of the panel
opinion. 43 Therefore, the dissent argued that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine did not apply.44 By dismissing the appeal,

40. See id. Judge Reinhardt argued that two "extremely important issues" were
before the court and should be carefully examined. These two constitutional were: (1)
whether Parretti's arrest pursuant to an extradition treaty with France violated the
Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether his detention without bail prior to France's request for his extradition violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
id., at 510. In regard to the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the
Ninth Circuit panel decision declined to dismiss the appeal under the doctrine noting
that "Parretti is not seeking further relief from this court, and the relief we previously
provided is of not further benefit to him." See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 766 n.22. This doctrine would only have been applicable had Parretti fled the United States prior to the
Ninth Circuit's order for his release from custody. See id.
41. See id. at 513. Disentitlement requires a "nexus" between a defendant's fugitive status and the appellate proceedings. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244.
42. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513. See also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820,
828 (1996) ("[tlhe sanction of disentitlement is most severe and 80 could disserve the
dignitary purposes for which it is invoked. The dignity of a court derives from the
respect accorded its judgments. That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by too free a
recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on the merits."). See also U.S. v.
Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820
(1996}), holding that: "The Supreme Court has refused to allow application of disentitlement when enforcement is possible despite the appellant's absence." Barnette, 129
F.3d 1184.
43. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513. In cases where the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has been invoked, the relevant appellate proceeding had been invoked by the
fugitive. See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1879) (Supreme Court refused to hear
a writ of error to review a criminal conviction, brought by the convicted party when the
defendant had escaped from the court's jurisdiction); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S.
365 (1970) (Supreme Court held that where the defendant, who was free on bail, failed
to surrender himself to state authorities, his appeal would be dismissed: "No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal
case after the conlJicted defendant who has sought relJiew escapes from the restraints
placed upon him pursuant to the conviction." (Emphasis added.)}. See also Empire
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
the defendants had forfeited their right to appeal the judgment against them under the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine). In Parretti, the government petitioned for rehearing
en bane, not Parretti, who was at that time a fugitive.
44. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513.
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the dissent concluded that the court was "frustrating its ability
to resolve critical constitutional claims. "45
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

The constitutional issues before the Ninth Circuit en banc
court remain unresolved, leaving a split in the circuit courts. 46
In light of the compelling issues before the Ninth Circuit and
the frequency with which these issues arise in extradition
cases, some commentators reiterated the need for the Supreme
Court to provide some guidance in this area. 47
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit broadened the applicability of
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to enable a court to dismiss
an appeal even when the fugitive is not the party seeking relief. 48 This extension of the doctrine thwarts its underlying

45.

Id.
See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (upheld a
warrant even though it was based on a complaint that alleged only that Wiebe was
charged with an extraditable crime); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir.
1980) (interpreted the "further information" language of the extradition treaty between
the U.S. and Italy as requiring a showing of probable cause); Sahagian v. United
States, 864 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir 1988) (interpreted the "further information" language in the extradition treaty with Spain as requiring a showing of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant for provisional arrest); In the Matter of Rovelli, 977 F.Supp.
566 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding "no reason to elevate precedent from the criminal context,
or from a lone Ninth Circuit extradition case, over the clear and long-standing extradition precedent of the United States Supreme Court and the Second Circuit"). The
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
denied on October 5, 1998, see Parretti v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 179.
47. See Lis Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extend·
ing Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition
from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729, 787 (1998) (noting that: "The Court
has not addressed the bail issue in extradition since Wright v. Henkel in 1903, and has
not heard a case addressing the standards for the issuance of provisional warrants in
nearly as long"). See also, Nathaniel Persily, International Extradition and the Right to
Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 407, 436-438 (1998) (questioning the viability of the Court's
decision in Wright v. Henkel and calling for the reformation of the "special circumstances test"); Jeffrey Olson, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause Standard for Provisional Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 161 (1998) (asserting that should a similar case arise, Congress may eventually have to act by redrafting the statute that sets forth the procedure for extradition requests pursuant to
treaties, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, and that the U.S. may have to renegotiate its extradition
treaties).
48. See supra note 43.
46.
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purpose. 49 Not only does the en bane court's invocation of the
doctrine appear to have been applied inappropriately under the
facts of this case, it would appear to be disfavored under Degen
v. United States, 50 as well. 51

Nedia L. DeSouza *

49. See supra note 5. The doctrine is viewed as a sanction against fugitives who
call upon the court's resources. Therefore, dismissing an appeal when someone other
than the fugitive seeks relief from the court fails to serve the doctrine's purpose.
50. 517 U.S. 820 (1996) (emphasizing that rules such as the fugitive disentitlement doctrine that foreclose consideration of claims oJ:t the merits should be used cautiously so as not to erode judicial integrity).
51. See supra note 42.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1999.
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